Posted By: ManipUni | Oct 29th @ 2:18 PM
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Comments: 9 | Views: 338
ManipUni
ManipUni
Proving QQ for 5 years!

I understand that sometimes you have no way of agreeing either the encryption standard or key with the other party but why for all that is good and holy did they decide that the best solution to that was just to drop encryption entirely?

Here are two more secure suggestions without breaking the concept of "public wifi" (or "open wifi"):
 - A default key and protocol that rotates constantly. So unless someone has been watching every second of contact they cannot break in later.
 - When you sign on to the network you get a unique public key. If you ever return to the network in the future you can then re-use that same public key in order to turn an insecure wireless hotspot into a secure one.

Both of these depend on nobody listening when you first connect but frankly in the real world that adds a massive amount more security than the existing "no security" solution.
 
You might suggest very small speed and cost drawbacks but yet for the huge benefit would be well worth it.

Currently the only working security measure you can take is VPN (which requires an end-point that you trust, and 3rd party software) or using HTTPS and hoping that they're an idiot.

Kryptos
Kryptos
Backup People!

I assume you are thinking about this because off the BBC watchdog programme....  I think that you suggestion is an intresting one.....

Bass
Bass
www.s​preadfirefox.c​om/5years/

C9 dbl post fail

Bass
Bass
www.s​preadfirefox.c​om/5years/

Both of these depend on nobody listening when you first.


Why leave such a design flaw?

 

- AP sends encryption key to client, keeps secret decryption key

---> Hax0r listening in also gets encryption key

- Client encrypts a new key (for symmetric encryption) and sends to AP

---> Hax0r listening in can not decrypt the message, since they lack the decryption key

- AP and client communicate with symmetric encryption using the newly agreed on key

 

Even if Hax0r tries to spoof a message (since he knows the original encryption key), it won't easily work since client can't decrypt the spoofed message, only the AP.

W3bbo
W3bbo
The Master of Baiters

There are reasons not to encrypt wifi... for ease of sharing it, for example. You might just say "then Starbucks should just pass the WPA key to all its customers" but if it did that then they can still see each other's packets if they intercept it right.

 

As a user of unencrypted wifi, I'm not concerned: SSL/TLS still provides protection for confidential information where necessary (like online banking) and the relative difficulty of snooping wifi means I'm not concerned anyway.

 

As for home wifi: it's usually unprotected because it needs configuration. I think wifi access points should use pre-shared keys by default, all with their own unique factory preset keys printed on a sticker on the device, rather than being disabled or some stupid preset like 'password' or 'linksys' (and not just SSIDs too).

W3bbo
W3bbo
The Master of Baiters

That assumes the h4x0r isn't attempting an MITM attack, but this is easily rectifiable with some kind of trusted certificate being given to the AP, however this wouldn't work for consumer routers because of a lack of expertise on the side of its users, and the ease of extracting a cert from another AP and posing as that.

bureX
bureX
Always a step ahead in stupidity.

Unencrypted WiFi combined with a VPN gateway (with a certificate) works nicely... except when somebody is expecting to access a network resource without connecting to it first, and a rogue DHCP server is present - delivering itself as the default gateway address. Most businesses aren't ready to cope with these solutions so they simply ditch 802.11 based wireless connectivity altogether.

 

Does anybody have experience with IEEE 802.1X? It sounds interesting, but I've never tried it.

blowdart
blowdart
Peek-a-boo

I wouldn't trust SSL over insecure WiFi. Hijacking your session isn't rocket science with the tools bouncing around these days.

 

Why? Are you using self signed certs?

 

Encrypting a public wifi doesn't offer protection - not really. The bad guys are the people that either

 

a) Setup their laptops so it looks like an access point, then sniff traffic and forward it on OR

b) Setup a fake access point and silently intercept calls, with DNS redirection et al.

 

Now SSL, through trusted CAs rules out both of these scenarios. As does TLS for email etc.

 

Over the air unencrypted packets aren't the real problem/

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