Mitigating Credential Theft using the Windows 10 Isolated User Mode

Play Mitigating Credential Theft using the Windows 10 Isolated User Mode

The Discussion

  • User profile image

    It seems like the real problem is that the Windows world doesn't treat the Administrator account as rare and sacred as the Unix world treats the root account. You generally can't load an arbitrary driver with CreateService() unless you're an Administrator, yet a fresh desktop install always starts me right off with Administrator privileges. This does not compute!

  • User profile image

    So how much of this applies to my non domain joined Windows 10 laptop?

    The video was very interesting - a clear description of a difficult subject.

  • User profile image
    Jason Fossen

    Great! Even more technical detail would be nice, such as about the RPC from LSASS into LSAISO/CredGuard, hypervisor and VMBus attacks, how each machine has a unique AES256 key for IUM memory dumps but there is also another (private?) key at Microsoft which can be used to decrypt the dumps, future plans for other trustlets in IUM besides CI/CredGuard, how this all relates to Intel CPU extensions like SGX, etc. More please! Thanks!

  • User profile image
    Seth Moore

    Great questions. We're super jazzed about this feature, and it's cool to see interest in it.

    @sjypharmhotm​ail - We cannot, unfortunately, make strong security statements about non-joined systems. Credentials in memory are certainly better protected when Credential Guard is enabled, yet we have not mitigation for an attacker who manages to find a way to disable the feature.

    It was a conscious decision to focus on enterprise scenarios, because that's where the effects of attacks like Pass-the-Hash are most felt. Another way to look at it is this: The feature isn't protecting the client so much as preventing the spread of attackers once they have managed to root a client. It's all about limiting lateral traversal.

    @electricninja33 - Being an Administrator account on Windows is akin to being in the sudoers file in Linux (though, admittedly, with less granularity). An elevation process is required, in both systems, before you can do truly nasty things to the OS. In either system, if you're granted privileges, even indirectly, and your creds are stolen, the system is getting owned.


  • User profile image

    Would any of these mitigations prevent the use of domain credentials from a non-domain joined computer?

Add Your 2 Cents