1 hour ago, figuerres wrote
we have this thing that perhaps should be replaced, it was created back when there was no way to count up all the votes fast and no way to have real time news.
so no your vote does not select the president, you are asking the "college" members of your state to cast a vote, they may or may not vote as you asked them to vote.
Yes I understand the electoral college and how it defines our republic. But this post was started because of the use of code in the voting process combined with the evidence individuals are putting pressure on developers to create code that alters votes just as they are cast. Right now evidence is at the individual level. The corrupting powers are greater than an individual here or there ... but until evidence comes out we can't go there yet.
Vote tampering via code would be a black eye for our industry. Developers must push back if presented with such a situation because "backbone exists in 0s and 1s too".
So going back to my prior post and expanding on that
Again this year I will go to the voting booth and cast a ballot.
And again this year I will take a photo of the ballot with my phone.
And again this year I will have no way to compare my input with what was actually recorded in the FINAL vote tallies.
Doesn't that seem odd that something so basic is not in place?
At first I thought ... well the process is a carry over from the days of paper voting. Sure in a paper voting situation with a low number of voters it is possible for the election officials to validate with the actual voter. But as the number of voters increase the paper based validation becomes untimely. And so I can see the validation not being possible. Additionally in lower numbers it is harder to inject manual fraud.
But then electronic voting came along. This should have removed the untimeliness problems with high numbers of voters. Yet today an individual voter can not confirm their voting choices are reflected in the FINAL vote tallies.
Sure, in a few jurisdictions (not mine or any I've ever lived in), they can get a paper receipt. Here is an example in Orange County California:
"The VVPAT printer allows a voter to verify their selections and compare them to the on-screen summary prior to casting their ballot."
Notice this is prior to casting their ballot. So not only is it before they actually vote but is well before all the other handling of the votes where fraud can be injected as well.
Let's come up with a way for each voter to cast their vote in a container (some unit of storage) that is encrypted with a private key that only the voter knows. The vote tally systems would use a public key to see the vote value(s). Vote tally being the vote totals for each candidate.
So now at this point the fraud injection point has been moved through the process to the point of the tally. Now what type of mechanism could be employed that would reveal fraud injection in the tally? The answer ... the ability for anyone to tally using the same containers to confirm the official vote tally.
The containers are publicly listed. The identifying internal data in the container is encrypted privately from the overall container encryption.
1. 3rd parties can confirm the official vote tally.
2. An individual voter with their unique container number (let's presume a GUID is assigned) can verify their recorded vote.